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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
New ventures are characterised by a high likelihood of closure and by considerable variation 
between firms and over short periods of time within firms. Given this variation, the challenge facing 
scholars is to offer insights into the factors influencing that performance.  Unfortunately, being able 
to distinguish the future major economic players from the numerically dominant “short-lifers” and 
the “non-growers” is difficult, particularly when the venture is young. Are there explanations for why 
some prosper but most do not? Even more challenging is whether these explanations can then be 
used to forecast the survival and/or growth of individual, or groups of, new ventures. 
 
There is considerable value for business owners, providers of finance and governments in being able 
to predict post-start performance. For business owners the value is the availability of a route-map to 
enable them to check progress over time and to avoid mistakes. For providers of finance, being able 
to more accurately estimate the optimum date to provide finance is valuable because too early an 
investment may be too risky, whereas delay may mean the opportunity is seized by a rival. Finally, 
governments are continually faced with the choice of using taxpayer’s funds to support and stimulate 
start-ups or instead to delay support until performance metrics become clearer. The optimal 
combination of support at different stages as new ventures evolve could provide considerable social 
and economic returns. 
 
This paper is motivated by a desire to capture the benefits to all three parties of being able to predict 
post-start performance. To begin with, it presents Gambler’s Ruin (GR) theory – a simple model 
which holds that growth is random but that survival depends on accumulated resources (lagged size, 
which is the sum of start-up size and growth since start-up). This distinguishes it from Strategic 
Entrepreneurship (SE) which assumes there are specific and identifiable characteristics of the owners 
and the business that enable it to shape its own performance. 
   
Despite its drawbacks, GR is a useful model in our context because it can be used to derive 
predictions for the evolution of the R2 for growth and survival in the years after start-up. GR 
therefore suggests that the growth fog is thick, and remains thick over time. With regards to survival, 
however, GR predicts that survival becomes more predictable in the years after entry, as surviving 
new ventures acquire resources that enable them to “ride out” the inevitable vicissitudes of trade 
that characterise the new venture in its early months and years. These theoretical predictions are 
then tested on a sample of 6247 new ventures, all of which began to trade in the UK in the same 
quarter of 2004. Our chosen approach is Gambler’s Ruin (GR) which we use to seek to explain the 
performance of new ventures – where performance includes both growth and survival. 
 
The key empirical novelty of the paper is, by taking the Nagelkerke R2 statistic as a measure of the 
density of the fog, to investigate how the fog changes as the new venture matures. We seek to 
explain the variation across firms in terms of survival and growth, by considering their observed 
characteristics. How important are observed characteristics in explaining survival and growth, and 
how does their explanatory power change in the years since entry? We show the evolution of the 
Nagelkerke R2 statistic obtained from growth regressions and survival regressions in the 6 years after 
entry, and observe that while the ability to predict variation across firms in growth rates deteriorates 
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in the years after entry, the ability to predict variation across firms in survival improves somewhat. 
This approach is only possible because the large dataset available to us monitors all financial 
transactions by a new venture from the day it begins trading. These trends in the R2 coefficient are 
not linear or monotonic, however, and we suspect that macroeconomic phenomena (such as the 
start of a major recession from 2008) also play a role in determining the amount of ‘fog’ that 
obfuscates the performance landscape.  
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discusses the GR, which leads up to the 
development of hypotheses in Section 3. Section presents our methodology. Section 5 presents the 
dataset, and we test our hypotheses in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. THEORY 
  
According to insights from Strategic Entrepreneurship, there are specific and identifiable 
characteristics of the business or its owner(s) that enable the new venture to shape its economic 
environment. The definition used by Ireland et al (2003, p963) is that: “Strategic entrepreneurship 
(SE) involves simultaneous opportunity-seeking and advantage-seeking behaviours and results in 
superior firm performance.” These “opportunity-seeking and advantage-seeking behaviours” reflect 
the psychological make-up of the owner – referred to as the entrepreneurial mind-set, most clearly 
reflected in the ability to recognise opportunities. However the novel duality of Strategic 
Entrepreneurship is its combination of both recognising, but also exploiting, opportunities. The latter 
is captured by the ability to manage strategically three forms of entrepreneurial capital: financial, 
human and social capital. At the heart of strategic entrepreneurship is knowledge or talent which 
may be in the form of the human capital of the owners and co-workers but also crucially, an ability to 
learn from past trading experience.  
 
What is distinctive about SE is that it explicitly links these identifiable characteristics of individuals, or 
combinations of individuals, to “superior firm performance”. Research into firm growth, however, 
has found it particularly difficult to predict firm performance (Coad, 2009; McKelvie and Wiklund, 
2010). On the one hand, the lack of persistence in firm growth rates suggests that most firms are not 
able to configure the elusive bundle of strategic resources that will confer lasting superior 
performance. On the other hand, sustained competitive advantage is not incompatible with a 
random walk model of firm growth (Denrell, 2004). Although some factors are associated with faster 
growth (such as size and age, with small, younger firms generally growing faster), nonetheless the 
predictive power of these models is low, such that the suggested benchmark or reference point is 
that firm growth rates are approximately random. Geroski (2000, p169) summarizes thus: "The most 
elementary 'fact' about corporate growth thrown up by econometric work on both large and small 
firms is that firm size follows a random walk"  
 
 We therefore take a random walk model of firm growth as our baseline theoretical model, as 
proposed by Gibrat (1931) as a statistical explanation for the observed log-normal firm size 
distribution. Here the probability of a proportionate change in size over time is the same for all firms 
in a given industry, irrespective of their size at the beginning of the period (Mansfield, 1962). Gibrat’s 
Law therefore implies the firm lacks control over the environment in which it either buys inputs or 
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sells its output – reflecting the textbook model of perfect competition. Gibrat’s Law models growth in 
terms of the following random process: 
 
xt  = xt-1 + εt,         (1) 
 
where xt is the logarithm of firm size at time t, and ε is a random shock (additive in logs, but 
multiplicative on a linear scale).  
 
While Gibrat’s Law makes no predictions for survival, Gambler’s Ruin augments the Gibrat’s Law 
model with survival being a function of the stock of accumulated resources. The case where the 
gambler leaves the table because of an exhausted supply of resources is comparable to the business 
owner who has no finance with which to continue trading. The firm’s survival, S, depends on whether 
it is above a minimum threshold size x*: 
 
S = 1 if xl>x*;  otherwise S=0        (2) 
 
Where xl is a latent variable that corresponds to x if xl >x*, but remains unobserved if xl <=x*. If x*>0, 
then players will not persist until bankruptcy, but will quit the table before they have completely 
exhausted their stocks of resources.  
 
Modifications and extensions of this survival condition can also be mentioned. For example, there is 
the rare case of the individual who is a major winner and who is able to sell the business without 
ever having to work again.2 Another possible motive for business exit is the case where the business 
owner quits because of the current availability of more attractive options – such as waged 
employment or retirement – or is influenced by how they expect the business to perform in the 
future (Gimeno et al, 1997).3 
 
Gambler’s Ruin (GR) therefore retains the random walk component of Gibrat’s Law but supplements 
it with the key concept of the stock of financial resources. These are assumed to enhance the survival 
of the firm, meaning that firms with access to them are more likely to survive, and weather the 
inevitable series of adverse shocks, than otherwise similar firms without such resources. In the GR 
model these resources are exclusively financial. They do not include the wider concept of resources 
captured within the Resource-Based View of the firm (Barney 2001).  
 
Gambler’s Ruin therefore generalizes Gibrat’s growth process to make predictions concerning 
survival (see also Levinthal, 1991).  
 
In summary, GR assumes business growth is a random walk but that access to financial resources 
influences the survival of the business and so, indirectly, its performance. GR predicts that two 
                                                          
2
 This is referred to as the “special case” because of its rarity. About 500,000 businesses are started in the UK annually, of 
which two thirds cease to trade in six years. Of these, less than 2% have sales of £1m in six years. As for the ultimate “win” 
of an IPO launch, Ritter (2011) shows that, even in the US, there were only 7617 between 1980 and 2011, or less than 250 
per year. So, if the UK had the same rate of conversion to IPOs as the US, and none of the IPOs were acquisitions, then it 
would imply a chance of approximately 1 in 10,000 new businesses becoming an IPO. 
3
They however note: "we found survival and growth to be governed by similar stochastic processes." P.387 
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finance-related factors positively influence new firm survival. The first is that those that begin large, 
because they have access to prior wealth, are able to “ride out” the inevitable vicissitudes of trade 
faced by a new venture. The second is the role of “early wins” (i.e., growth since start-up). These 
generate not only internal resources but also external resources from providers in an opaque 
marketplace that interpret these “wins” as a signal of quality or talent. 
 
3. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
 
We now derive the hypotheses to be tested in Section 5. We are primarily interested in investigating 
the goodness-of-fit of models that seek to explain the survival and growth of new ventures. 
Hypothesis 1 relates to the R2 statistics obtained from growth rate regressions, while Hypothesis 2 
relates to the R2 statistics obtained from survival regressions.  
 
Regarding growth, Gambler’s Ruin follows Gibrat’s Law in approximating firm growth as a random 
walk: given that the dynamics of (log) size are xt = xt-1 + εt, the growth rate (in log-differences) is 
expressed entirely in terms of a random shock: xt  - xt-1 = εt. Growth remains random in the years 
after start-up – it does not depend on start-up size or other firm-level factors. Therefore, Gambler’s 
Ruin would predict that the R2 from growth regressions is low and remains low over time4.  
 
Hypothesis 1: the R2 from growth regressions will be low and remain low in the years after startup 
 
In order to hypothesise the expected changes in the R2 from survival regressions, we need to 
reconsider Gambler’s Ruin in more detail. As before, firm size at time t is denoted as xt, with start-up 
size being denoted as x0. Firm size evolves as a random walk, with xt = xt-1 +εt, where εt follows a 
Gaussian distribution with mean μ and variance σ2). When μ = 0, we have a pure random walk, 
whereas when μ > 0 then there is a steady increase in expected resource stock over time. According 
to the Gambler's Ruin model, firms are assumed to exit when their size (proxied by their resource 
stock) reaches zero. The analogy is that of a gambler who leaves the gambling table when they have 
run out of gambling chips.  
 
We rewrite the model in continuous time, with dx(t) = μ dt + σ dz(t), where dz(t) is a standard Wiener 
process. The time taken until the firm first reaches the bankruptcy condition xt = 0 can be expressed 
as the cumulative distribution function of a random variable in the following way (known as the 
Bachelier-Lévy formula): 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           (3) 
                                                          
4
We consider it trivial that the R
2
 will be low and driven by stochastic noise, therefore we do not see the need to use a 
simulation model here to demonstrate the evolution of the R
2
. 
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 where N(.) represents the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution. Time to exit is 
thus a function of three parameters: the trend in the random walk μ, the variance σ2 of the growth 
shocks, and start-up size x0. Even though growth may be a random process, the expected survival 
time can be increased by increasing the size at start-up x0. The R
2 from survival regressions therefore 
depends on both start-up size and growth since start-up. 
 
We now apply a simulation model to derive implications of Gambler’s Ruin for the evolution of the 
R2. We generate an artificial dataset of 50,000 firms, whose start-up size is calibrated according to 
the lognormal distribution with mean 10.55 and standard deviation 1.5, in order to closely follow the 
empirical start-up size distribution. We then generate a distribution of growth rates, distributed 
according to the Laplace, or symmetric exponential (Stanley et al., 1996; Bottazzi and Secchi 2006), 
with mean -0.1 and standard deviation 0.9 (again, closely following observed values).  Firm size 
evolves as a random walk, xt = xt-1 +εt, given the distributions of start-up size and growth rates given 
above, for t=60 periods. The exit threshold x* is set at 7 in the baseline case, which is deliberately 
chosen to be a relatively high value that will guarantee that in each period some firms will exit (thus 
avoiding a degenerate value for the R2 in any year’s survival regression in which all firms survive). For 
each individual period up to t=60 we estimate a probit survival regression (with a constant term and 
a single explanatory variable: lagged size) and record the Nagelkerke R2 statistic. Figure 1 shows that 
the R2 clearly increases in the years since start-up. This increase in R2 presumably occurs because, 
with the passage of time, surviving firms supplement their initial resources at start-up with post-
entry ‘wins’ and grow to become sufficiently large that they no longer operate on the brink of the 
exit threshold. Firms that start small, on the other hand, will be weeded out through a selection 
effect, and as they exit in the years after start-up, the selection environment becomes less ‘foggy’ as 
chaotic, short-lived firms are removed. The central point here is that the R2 value rises over time even 
when performance is a random walk. 
 
While Gambler’s Ruin considers performance to be a random process, Strategic Entrepreneurship 
offers other reasons why the survival R2 may increase in the years since start-up. First, firms might be 
able to apply their human capital to learn and gain experience from their business activity, improve 
their productivity and viability over time, and develop capabilities that enhance their survival 
prospects.  These variables can be expected to affect start-up size, exit threshold, and also a firm’s 
growth rates – in other words, the set {x0, x*, μ, σ}. If these Strategic Entrepreneurship variables are 
significant, then the increase in R2 since start-up may be even higher than that observed for the 
Gambler’s Ruin case. Second, while Gambler’s Ruin is a simplistic model that ignores financial 
markets, in reality banks and lenders might be more willing to provide support to businesses that 
have overcome the ‘liability of newness’ to enjoy a reputation as being an established business in the 
field. 
 
With regards to the R2 obtained from survival regressions, we therefore hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: The R2 from survival regressions will increase in the years after start-up  
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Figure 1: evolution of the Nagelkerke R2 using simulated data, for 60 periods. y-axis: Nagelkerke R2 
obtained from probit regressions where exit depends on lagged size. x-axis: time period. Baseline 
case (with exit threshold x*=7) appears as a solid line; x*=8 for the long-dash line; x*=9 for the short-
dash line. Linear trendline plotted for the baseline case.  
 
4 .METHODOLOGY  
 
Of crucial interest to our paper is the measure of what we call ‘fog’ – the coefficient of 
determination, or R2 statistic, which is the proportion of variance explained in contrast to that which 
remains unexplained. However, there are other indicators of ‘goodness of fit’ or explanatory power 
that are preferable to the usual R2 statistic because they have more desirable properties. For 
example, the “adjusted-R2” is often preferred to the standard R2 because it takes into account the 
number of explanatory variables (that is, unlike R2 the adjusted- R2 only increases if the additional 
explanatory variables improve the model fit over and above what would be expected by mere 
chance).5 More generally, Nagelkerke (1991) sets out a list of 7 desirable properties for an ideal R2 
statistic, and to satisfy these requirements he proposes what has become known as the “Nagelkerke 
R2.” Our analysis of the goodness of fit of our regression models is based primarily on analysis of the 
Nagelkerke R2, although we show that our results are not sensitive to this choice of R2 statistic.  
As a starting point, we run regressions for each year, where the dependent variable is either growth 
rate or survival probability. For each year we obtain an R2 statistic. These regressions are shown in 
Tables 3 and 4.  
We begin by plotting the evolution of the Nagelkerke R2 over time using line charts – one chart for 
growth, one for survival. This gives a simple overview of the change over time – whether the trend is 
generally increasing or decreasing over the years. However, to assess whether the differences are 
statistically significant we apply some tests that involve associating a standard error to the 
                                                          
5
In our regressions, however, we keep the same number of explanatory variables in each year, to maintain 
comparability. 
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Nagelkerke R2 statistic.  
How can we assess the significance of the changes in the R2 statistic? In some regressions, a 
significant change in R2 is investigated by comparing the R2 before and after adding some extra 
variables. In this situation, the same sample of observations is used in both cases, and the same 
baseline variables are included, but the R2 changes as new variables are added (e.g. Tanriverdi and 
Lee, 2008, p390). However, what we have in mind is different – we want to compare the R2 over 
different years (i.e. with different cross-sectional subsamples for the different years), although we 
use the same number of observations and the same set of explanatory variables, to see if the same 
explanatory variables provide a better fit as firms get older. We therefore follow the following 
procedure:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. THE DATASET: BARCLAYS BANK CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS 
 
To adequately test the above theories we require a dataset that permits the analysis of survival and 
growth of new businesses. In the UK the bulk6 of prior empirical work on this topic has used data 
sources that are restricted to limited companies (Foreman-Peck, 1985) or to firms appearing in 
official public records (Van Stel and Storey, 2004), or to selected survey respondents (Westhead et al., 
2005) or on the self-employed (Burke et al, 2008; Dawson and Henley, 2013). Compared with the 
data source used in this paper – new business customers of Barclays Bank – these data sets suffer 
from up to six serious problems. First, their coverage is not only incomplete but subject to the bias 
noted by Yang and Aldrich (2012) – particularly the inadequate coverage of the smallest and newest 
                                                          
6
 The notable exception is Cressy (1996) which used data from National Westminster Bank – now Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS). 
BOOTSTRAP ALGORITHM:  
1) Randomly draw a sample of size n=1000 observations for a given year (bootstrapping without 
replacement) 
2) Perform a survival or growth regression on these n=1000 observations, then repeat for r=1000 
replications (with other randomly-selected samples of n=1000) to obtain a distribution of r=1000 
estimates of the sample R2 statistic 
3) Obtain the mean, and the standard error of the mean, for the distribution of R2 statistics for a 
given year 
4) Repeat for all available years 
5) Apply two-sample t-tests to see if the means of the distributions of R2 statistics are significantly 
different.  
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enterprises. The second is that of incomplete performance data. For example the self-employment 
data only identify whether or not an individual is self-employed and not the performance of the 
enterprise.  The third limitation of many studies is a reliance on self-report data – without the full 
significance of such individuals being recognised as highly optimistic (Storey, 2011; Cassar, 2010). Our 
data avoids the use of self-report information, other than that provided by the individual(s) prior to 
start-up. A fourth problem is that new venture studies can be restricted to a single sector, thus 
making generalisations difficult (Fan, 2010). The data set used here covers all sectors of the UK 
economy with the exception of financial services. Fifth, the size of the data set is considerable; with 
all financial transaction examined amongst 6247 businesses that began to trade for the first time in 
the March-May 2004. Finally, almost all studies of new firms do not identify the enterprise when it 
first begins to trade – indeed many are several years old yet are classified as “new”. 
Start-up: definition 
Our dataset was drawn from non-financial firms identified as start-ups who entered Barclays’ 
customer base between March and May 2004. We exclude established businesses that switch from 
another Bank. We are aware that a new business does not necessarily start trading immediately 
upon opening an account. Indeed, for Barclays customers, approximately five percent of start-ups 
show no activity through their account in the subsequent 12 months. We addressed this by only 
including firms that showed activity in the month following entry to the customer base.7 8 
We therefore have a cohort of 6247 firms that undertake their first business transaction at virtually 
the same point in time. This is important, because firms starting in different years may not be readily 
comparable (especially if the macroeconomic conditions at start-up have persistent effects on firm 
development in subsequent years). Focusing on a single cohort means that firms face the same 
macroeconomic conditions at each year of their development, and can therefore be meaningfully 
compared with each other.   
Start-up: data 
Basic owner(s) data was collected on gender and age and, at start-up, respondents were also asked 
to fill in a questionnaire. To capture one element of human capital identified in Table 1 customers 
were asked about the highest level of educational qualification obtained by the owner(s). As with 
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We also included a small proportion of firms who did not show activity in their first full month, but in either May or June 
2004. In these cases the start month of the firm was recorded as the month prior to activity. 
8
 The UK, unlike many countries in continental Europe, is not characterised by multiple banking (Ongena and Smith (2000)). 
The account at a single bank is therefore likely to capture the full trading activities of the new venture. 
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other studies (van der Sluis et al 2005) this was intended to act as a proxy for the human capital 
available to the new firm. The second sought information about prior business experience on the 
grounds that learning could have taken place in other enterprises (Westhead et al., 2005). This 
included previous ownership and/or ownership among immediate family members, so capturing 
both work-related capital and family support. Finally, to capture access to non-financial resources, 
owners were asked about the sources of advice and support they used of prior to start-up.  
We then supplement this data with information collected by the bank as part of its general account 
opening process. These are whether there is more than a single owner, the legal form of the business, 
the activity type (sector/branch/market) and its location (standard region) within the UK.  
Ongoing data 
To measure the size of the business we used credit turnover – the value of payments into a current 
account.9 This serves as a very close approximation to sales revenue inclusive of taxes. The much 
greater granularity of turnover compared with, for example, using measures of employee numbers is 
a particular strength. Drawing such data from bank records also provides other advantages. One is 
the direct observation of data without the need to survey businesses.10 Another is the greater 
frequency with which the data can be observed. Every financial transaction is documented and credit 
turnover is available monthly rather than being limited to often very lengthy periods of time. For our 
dataset turnover was aggregated across periods from the date of start-up. 
Table 1:  Variable names and definitions.  
Dependent 
variables Description 
Open = 1;  Enterprise continues to trade at end of period (Open = 0 if the enterprise 
exited) 
Growth Rate Growth is measures as Credit turnover – value of payments into a current 
account - excluding payments from a related account (deposit account). 
The growth rate is the log-differences of turnover [log(turnover(t)) - 
log(turnover(t-1)].  
Independent 
variables 
 
Legal form Legal form of business: 1 = Company, 2 = Partnership, 3 = Sole Trader 
Industry 
dummies 
Business activity: 1 = Agriculture, 2 = Manufacturing, 3 = Construction, 4 = 
Motor Trades, 5 = Wholesale, 6 = Retail, 7 = Hotels & Catering, 8 = 
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Excluding payments from related accounts, e.g. deposit accounts held by the business. 
10
This can also be obtained from business accounts, although it can be time-consuming to access these for small firms and, 
in the case of the UK, a large proportion of the corporate population is not required to supply this information. 
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Transport, 9 = Property Services, 10 = Business Services, 11 = Health, 
Education & Social Work, 12 = Other Services 
GOR Region 
dummies 
Region: 1 = East of England, 2 = East Midlands, 3 = London, 4 = North East, 
5 = North West, 6 = South East, 7 = South West, 8 = West Midlands, 9 = 
Yorkshire, 10 = Scotland, 11 = Wales, 12 = Northern Ireland 
No. owners Number of owners 
Excess owners Owners in excess of minimum number for legal form: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
Male owners Number of male owners 
Male owner 
involved 
At least one male owner: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
Age Mean age of owner(s) at start-up 
Age squared Square of age 
Education Highest level of educational attainment by owner(s): 1 = <NVQ2, 2 = NVQ2, 
3 = NVQ3, 4 = NVQ4 
No business 
experience 
Previous business experience, None: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
Family business 
experience 
Previous business experience, Family: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
Individual 
business 
experience 
Previous business experience, Owner: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
Sources of 
advice: 
 
  EABL Advice/support (prior to start-up), Enterprise Agency/Businesslink: 0 = No, 
1 = Yes 
  Accountant Advice/support, Accountant: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
  Solicitor Advice/support, Solicitor: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
  College Advice/support, College: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
  SR seminar Advice/support, (Barclays) Start Right Seminar: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
  PYBT Advice/support, Princes Trust: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
  Family Advice/support, Family/friends: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
  Other Advice/support, Other source(s): 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
Turnover Turnover  
Volatility Volatility of turnover 
Authorized 
overdraft use 
Use of approved overdraft limit during the period: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
extend of auth. 
OD use 
Average proportion of approved overdraft limit during the period 
Overdraft excess Excess use of overdraft during the period: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 
OD XS duration Proportion of time spent in overdraft excess during year x period y 
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The frequency of turnover data permits the creation of variables that have not been possible on this 
scale in any prior work, but which are vital in the testing of GR. This is because it places considerable 
emphasis on sales not falling below a given ‘reserve’ level, determined by the resources available to 
the owner, and thus inducing exit. As emphasized in Equation (3), the variance of sales, particularly 
amongst very young firms is assumed to influence the stay/quit decision. The unique monthly data 
available to us means it is possible to create a measure of turnover ‘volatility’ that captures this 
concept.11 
In addition to the level, growth and variability of turnover, bank records also provide the opportunity 
to formulate measures of the quality of financial management. For this dataset the key variable was 
unauthorised overdraft use. The overdraft is an important financial product in the UK and has 
traditionally been used as the first source of working capital for small firms. With prior agreement 
from the bank, the overdraft permits the customer to make payments, when the balance in their 
current account falls below zero. Provided the balance remains above a given amount then the 
customer only pays interest on the amount of overdraft used.12 However, customers can, in most 
cases, exceed their overdraft limit.13 If this occurs the bank usually applies both a flat charge and a 
considerably higher interest rate to the entire balance. The financial costs to exceeding an overdraft 
are therefore high. While, in extreme circumstances, firms may judge that it is worth incurring these 
costs, persistent unauthorised use points to poor financial management on the part of the owner(s). 
Our dataset includes two variables relating to unauthorised overdraft use. The first is a simple binary 
variable about whether the business was in unauthorised overdraft at any point during a six month 
period. The second records the proportion of that period spent in this position. To ensure these 
measures do not simply reflect more general overdraft use, i.e. that excess use provides additional 
information, we also include two further variables. One shows whether the firm used their overdraft 
at all, and the other shows the mean proportion of the limit used over the period. 
A full listing of the variables is provided in Table 1. 
Exit and closure 
                                                          
11
 We define volatility as the standard deviation of turnover (measured monthly) for each firm across a six month period 
divided by total turnover. This scales the measure to the size of the business. 
12
Although there may be a periodic charge to maintain it and the bank is able to change or withdraw it at short notice. 
13
Including where the business has no agreed limit. 
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As noted earlier, establishing when a business has closed is perhaps the most challenging aspect of 
any study of survival and growth. Even for datasets taken from near comprehensive official sources, 
the date at which exit occurs may be some time after actual closure.14 
When using bank records, there are two main issues to resolve. The first is to distinguish between 
those businesses that have closed and those that have switched to another bank. For our dataset we 
used Barclays closure reason codes that record why any given account has been closed. We identified 
6.36% of our initial sample as having switched over the six years covered by the dataset, i.e. they had 
closed their account with Barclays, but continued to trade.15  
The second issue is judging when a given business has actually closed. While the majority of Barclays 
customers ceasing to trade clearly close at a specific time when no more transactions take place, an 
important minority become dormant, i.e. their account remains open, but with no activity.16 For the 
firms in our sample we used a simple rule – if the business had shown no turnover in consecutive six 
month periods then it was deemed to have closed in the first of these periods.17 
It is important to note that this process identifies closures. It is not limited to business ‘failures’. By 
the latter we mean those firms that cease to trade with some external financial liability. Of course, as 
noted earlier, a closing firm may, or may not, have met the objectives of its owner(s), although 
closure may equally reflect that a better opportunity has presented itself. 
Summary statistics 
Table 2 provides an overview of the size and growth of businesses in our sample. Many of the firms 
are small, in comparison to datasets claiming to be of new enterprises. The median turnover of new 
enterprises in this dataset in year 1 is £39,276 which is far smaller than the VAT threshold of £73,000 
(above which firms generally start to appear in national administrative datasets). To investigate how 
our analysis is affected by our rich coverage of micro firms, we complement our baseline results with 
those obtained from restricting our sample to larger firms (that is, with above-median start-up size), 
hence making our sample more similar to other work on new ventures that over-samples larger firms 
(Yang and Aldrich, 2012). 
                                                          
14
 For example Storey et al (1987, p45), in a study of the closure of 177 Limited Companies that “failed”, identified seven 
decision-rules that were required  to identify the year in which the enterprise ceased to trade. A full discussion of these 
issues in found in Chapter 9 of Storey and Greene (2010). 
15
 This could be an understatement of the true number as imperfections in the coding process meant that not 
all switchers were recorded. However, other work suggests we have found most (if not all). Fraser (2005, p90), for 
example, reports that the annual rate of bank switching in the UK is just over 2% over all types of (SME) businesses. 
16
Indeed, some of these may have switched rather than closed. 
17
Some Barclays customer accounts can show little or no activity for a number of months before seeing turnover return to 
non-negligible levels. This reflects the nature of many ‘micro’ businesses. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for size and growth rates 
 
 
6. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
 
We begin with some plots of the evolution of the R2 statistic over time (Section 5.1), before assessing 
statistical significance using our Bootstrap Algorithm (Section 5.2). 
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6.1 Plotting the R2 statistics 
 
Growth 
 
Table 3 examines the factors influencing the growth rates of new firms in the sample. The first five 
columns show the results for Years 2 to 6 inclusive. The remaining five columns show the results for 
firms with above-median start-up size only.  
 
An examination of columns 1-5 shows the explanatory power – defined as the Nagelkerke R2 – falls 
over time from 0.224 in Year 2 to 0.170 in Year 6. This decline implies that the fog appears to thicken 
slightly rather than lift. 
 
At the level of the individual variables, in all five equations, lagged size negatively affects the growth 
rate, implying that smaller firms have faster growth rates. However, the general absence of 
significant human capital variables in the equations,18 and the low values of R2, provides little 
evidence in support of SE. For example, key elements of SE such as accessing advice, or any form of 
prior business experience do not appear to positively enhance growth.19 Other variables appear as 
significant in the equations for some years, but not consistently throughout all years, perhaps 
suggesting that different factors matter in different years. Examples of these include Age and Age2 
(Year 2 only); Education (Years 2, 5 and 6); Family business experience (Year 5 only); male owners 
(Year 2 only); and multiple owners (Years 2 and 3 only). 
 
However, two other variables or groups of variables are consistently significant. The first is legal form 
– showing that enterprises choosing limited company status at start-up were, in all years, more likely 
to show growth than those choosing to be either a partnership or sole traders.20 Second, a range of 
trading variables also strongly influence growth: these are that firms with highly volatile sales on a 
monthly basis were less likely to grow, as were those with an overdraft facility which they exceeded. 
 
It will be recalled that a key element of GR was the role played by “wins”, especially for survival. We 
capture this concept as lagged growth –implying that growth in the previous year both provides the 
resources for future growth directly but also indirectly through signalling the viability of the 
enterprise to external funders. Previous work has also found that lagged growth has a significant 
effect on future growth as well as survival (Coad, 2009).  For this reason Figures 2a and 2b takes the 
same time period and uses the same set of variables as in Table 3 but with the inclusion of lagged 
growth (at the cost of losing one year of observations). This lagged-growth variable is only marginally 
significant (if at all) in explaining growth, and there is no big improvement in the R2 values in the 
equation.  
 
                                                          
18
 We undertook tests of joint significance of the human capital variables (that is, business experience, education and 
advice variables) and in most cases they were jointly insignificant, although they were jointly significant at the 5% level in 
year 5 and year 6.  
19
 The one exception is that in Year 6 Start-Right Service does have a significantly positive sign. 
20
 Choice of legal form has been shown in prior empirical work to be associated with faster growth amongst new/young 
firms (Storey 1994).   
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Our second test is whether the explanatory power of our models changes over time – whether 
indeed the fog lifts. 
 
Figure 2a plots the evolution of the R2 statistics from Table 3, showing the R2 values for four 
subsamples. The R2 for the baseline sample is shown as a solid line. This we argue captures the SE 
Model by including a wide range of human capital variables. Other lines in Figure 2a correspond to a 
sample including lagged growth (at the expense of losing one year of observations),21 as well as the 
subsample of firms with above-median start-up size (with or without lagged growth). 
 
Figure 2a: OLS Growth regression Nagelkerke R2 statistics for the first 6 years, for 4 different growth 
rate regressions. Each year corresponds to a data cross-section.  
 
 
Figure 2b: OLS Growth regression Nagelkerke R2 statistics for the first 6 years, for 4 different growth 
rate regressions (focus on subsample of firms that survive until the end of year 6). Each year 
corresponds to a data cross-section. 
                                                          
21
 We include the R2 obtained from regressions controlling for lagged growth in the line charts, because lagged growth is a 
key variable for Gambler’s Ruin. However, for the sake of space they are not included in the regression tables.  
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KEY: Baseline: full sample. Baseline + lag: full sample controlling for lagged growth. Largestartup: 
above-median start-up size only. Largestartup + lag: above median start-up size subsample, 
controlling for lagged growth. 
Figure 2a shows that the R2 measure is generally low, ranging from 0.16 to 0.23 for the baseline 
estimates. Second, for all years, the Nagelkerke R2 values for the equations that only include the 
larger enterprises are slightly higher than for the baseline sample. This is in keeping with the Yang 
and Aldrich (2012) observation that much recent research has inflated our apparent ability to 
correctly explain outcomes by examining only those new enterprises sufficiently large and well-
established to be included in publicly available data bases.  
 
Figure 2b focuses on a subsample of firms that are ex post observed to have survived until the end of 
our sample period. Is it easier to predict the performance of firms that we know will survive for 
longer? Focusing on these ex post survivors allows us to leave aside the selection effect and focus 
only on the learning effect. Figure 2b shows non-monotonic fluctuations in the R2 coefficient. In each 
case, the R2 dips down slightly in the intermediate years before rising in the later years. In some cases 
(“baseline”, and “baseline + lag”) we observe that the final R2 is slightly higher than the initial R2, 
while in the other cases (“largestartup” and “largestartup + lag”) the final R2 is slightly lower than the 
initial value. All in all, however, we do not find evidence of a smoothly-increasing R2 that would be 
expected from learning effects. In fact, the R2 from regressions focusing on ex post survivors ranges 
from 0.12-0.23 and is lower than the R2 obtained from focusing on the full sample (which includes 
short-lived firms).  
 
Survival 
 
To test our Hypothesis 2 (relating to survival) we run year-by-year regressions. The dependent 
variable in these cross-sectional regressions is binary (corresponding to either survival or exit), and so 
we apply probit regressions (for a discussion of the use of dichotomous dependent variable 
regression models in survival analysis, see Jenkins 1995). Regression results are in Table 4, and the 
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evolution of the R2 statistic is shown in Figure 3. A first observation, in line with previous work,22 is 
that lagged size (that is, lagged log turnover) is a significant determinant of survival – and indeed, it is 
one of the few significant determinants. The only consistent human capital determinant of new firm 
survival is owner age.  Amongst the other human capital variables, most never appear as significant 
in any equation – prior experience, most advice sources. Furthermore, in some years we observe 
somewhat unexpected signs. For example education has a negative sign in year 4 and males a 
positive sign in year 1.23 
 
An examination of the survival results shows, as with the growth results, that choice of legal form – 
limited company status – clearly enhances survival. There are also some sectoral and regional 
influences, but the explanatory power of the baseline model in Table 4 is low. We therefore repeat 
the analysis with a subsample of above-median start-up size firms (last five columns of Table 4).  
 
This makes a substantial difference. Apart from age, the age-related human capital variables become 
largely non-significant, although legal form and some regional and sectoral variables continue to be 
significant. Instead, it is the Trading variables that exert a powerful influence on survival in the 
directions expected. Survival rates are much lower in enterprises having high volatility in sales 
income and by two measures of overdraft excess. It also shows the powerful role of (log of) current 
size, with larger firms having higher survival rates. 
 
In Figure 3 we show the Nagelkerke R2 statistics for these subsamples.24 It has three similarities to 
Figures 2a and 2b, but one major difference. The first similarity is that the R2 values are broadly 
comparable – ranging from around 0.16 to 0.25 for the baseline sample (but rising to 0.30 for firms 
with above-median start-up size). The second similarity is that the inclusion of a lagged growth 
variable – as implied by Gambler’s Ruin – improves the explanatory power of the model. The third 
similarity is that excluding the smallest firms also improves the values of the Nagelkerke R2.  
 
The key difference is that the R2 values generally rise over the years for survival – whereas they fell in 
Figures 2a and 2b for growth. It appears that, when seeking to explain new firm survival, “the fog 
clears” in the years after entry, but the fog remains dense when the task is to explain growth. 
 
Figure 3: Probit survival regression: Nagelkerke R2 statistics for years 1-6, for 4 different survival 
regressions. Each year corresponds to a data cross-section. 
                                                          
22
 See, among others, Mata and Portugal (2002).  
23
 Of the two, the negative education sign on survival could perhaps being explained by more educated individuals, having 
tried business ownership for a sufficient period to accurately assess its returns, being able more easily switch into an 
alternative form of employment.  
24
 We repeated the analysis focusing on the percentage of cases correctly classified, as provided by Stata as logistic 
regression post-estimation output. This can be taken as an alternative indicator of the ‘fog’, or our ability to predict the 
performance of firms. In line with our previous results, we observed that the percentage of cases correctly classified 
generally increased in the years since entry.  
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KEY: Baseline: full sample. Lag: full sample controlling for lagged growth. Large susize: above-median 
start-up size only. Large susize_lag: above median start-up size subsample, controlling for lagged 
growth. 
 
6.2 Statistical significance 
 
To address issues of statistical significance, we apply the Bootstrap Algorithm developed in Section 4. 
Figures 4 and 5 below show the distributions of bootstrapped R2 statistics obtained for each year.  
 
For growth, there is no monotonic trend (see Figure 4). The R2 drops from year 2 to year 3, drops 
further in year 4, but picks up again in year 5 (and then drops in year 6). Year 5 (corresponding to 
2008-09) stands out as a ‘blip’ that seems to interrupt a decreasing trend. The unexpected R2 statistic 
for year 5 could be related to the severe macroeconomic conditions in 2008-09 which corresponded 
to the onset of a major global recession. There is considerable overlap in the distributions from one 
year to the next – although to assess the statistical significance of changes in the R2 we will focus on 
the mean, and the standard error of the mean (SEM).  
 
Figure 5 shows the corresponding plot for survival. The trend here seems to be that the goodness-of-
fit for survival regressions increases in the years since start-up, although – once more – there is a 
‘blip’ in year 5 that breaks an otherwise monotonic trend.  
 
For each bootstrapped distribution of Nagelkerke R2 statistics, we report the mean and the SEM in 
Tables 5 and 6 (see also Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix). Tables 5 and 6 below present the 
outcome of two-sample t-tests with unequal variance to see if the mean of the R2 statistic is 
significantly different from the mean R2 in the first observable year, and also if it differs significantly 
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from the mean R2 in the previous year. Regarding the growth rate regressions (Table 5), our results 
show that the year-on-year change in R2 is significantly negative – apart from year 5, which jumps 
upwards. When we compare each year’s R2 with the R2 observed for the first observed period (that is, 
year 2) we see that the R2 in each case is significantly lower. Taken together, the evidence suggests 
that the R2 of growth rate regressions decreases over time. Regarding the survival regressions (Table 
6), the R2 generally increases over time, but it dips in year 5 to take an unexpectedly low value. 
Therefore the increase is not monotonic over the years. However, in each year after year 2, the R2 is 
significantly higher than the year 2 value. This suggests that the ‘fog’ affecting survival does lift.  
 
  
Figure 4: Evolution of bootstrapped Nagelkerke R2 distribution for growth regressions (full model). 
Bootstrapped sample size n=1000, replications r=1000. Box plots refer to baseline (left) and above-
median start-up size (right).  
 
 
  
Figure 5: Distribution of bootstrapped Nagelkerke R2 statistics obtained from probit survival 
regressions, n=1000, replications r=1000. Box plots refer to baseline (left) and above-median start-up 
size (right) samples.  
7. CONCLUSION 
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The starting point for this paper is that the performance of new ventures is highly diverse and that 
our ability to foresee the survival/growth of new ventures is weak.  In the terminology of this paper 
the fog was thick. However there are clear benefits to business owners, providers of finance and to 
governments in developing a better understanding of the factors influencing the performance of new 
ventures. The challenge therefore was to examine whether, as the new venture aged, it became 
easier to predict performance: did the fog lift? 
 
We began by identifying two measures of new firm performance – survival and growth – and then 
turned to Gambler’s Ruin (GR) to derive some theoretical predictions for the evolution of the 
explanatory power (R2 statistic) in the years after entry.  GR assumes that new venture growth is a 
random walk, whereas new venture survival depends on a combination of chance and access to 
financial resources. GR therefore suggests that the fog over growth is thick and remains thick over 
time. With regards to survival, however, GR predicts that survival becomes more predictable in the 
years after entry, as surviving new ventures acquire resources that enable them to “ride out” the 
inevitable vicissitudes of trade that characterise the new venture in its early months and years. 
 
Tested on a large sample of a cohort of UK new ventures over the years 2004-2010, our results show 
that the goodness-of-fit of growth rate regressions generally decreases in the years since start-up. 
However, the goodness-of-fit of survival regressions increase in years since start-up. Taken together, 
our results suggest that there is some kind of ‘uncertainty principle’ at work – over time it becomes 
easier to predict survival but more difficult to predict growth. It is not possible to accurately predict 
both survival and growth.  
 
One unexpected, but highly interesting, result is that our results show a ‘blip’ for year 5 – the growth 
rate regression R2 is higher than expected, and the survival R2 is lower than expected. This blip seems 
to interrupt what is otherwise a monotonic trend, perhaps due to the financial crisis. 
 
Another, more minor, contribution of this paper is to show that different factors matter for survival 
and growth in different years (e.g. authorized overdraft use loses its influence on survival and growth 
in later years). Furthermore, we observe that many variables that have been shown in prior work to 
have a significant effect on the growth and survival of new firms (such as education, sources of 
advice and prior business experience) had little effect on either growth or survival – in line with the 
stochastic dynamics that drive GR. 
 
Our view is that the novelty of these results is strongly, but not exclusively, linked to the quality of 
the data we have available to us. Cohort data has the advantage that all new ventures face the same 
macroeconomic phenomena at the same stage of development, the only downside being the 
insurmountable identification problems of distinguishing between macroeconomic factors and 
developmental factors in a single cohort of firms.  
 
What remains clear however is that raising the R2 and, by implication, giving the impression that the 
fog is less thick, can likely be achieved by having samples of new firms that are unrepresentative of 
the population. These include having firms that are not really new; that are comparatively large; that 
are survivors; that have employees; that provide data themselves that cannot be verified; that are 
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restricted to one industry or sector etc. Unfortunately, as we show, almost all other data sets on new 
venture performance exhibit at least one, and generally considerably more than one, of these 
characteristics. The fact that our data set suffers from none of these limitations goes some way to 
explaining why the fog appears to be thicker amongst our firms than those examined in much other 
work. 
 
We show that the fog appears to be considerably less thick once firms become larger and more 
established. Work using such data gives, what we believe to be, a misleading impression that the 
talents and skills of the founder(s) dominate the role of chance. Instead our view is that new venture 
founders can do all the “right things” and fail to survive. Equally they can do many of the “wrong 
things” and prosper at least for some time. It is this that causes the fog. 
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Table 3: Growth Rate regressions for each year. Columns (1) to (5) contain the baseline regressors, 
while columns (6) to (10) focus on firms with above-median start-up size. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Survival regressions for each year. Columns (1) to (5) contain the baseline regressors, while 
columns (6) to (10) focus on firms with above-median start-up size. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: tests of significance of changes in the mean R2 over the years, for growth rate regressions. SEM: Standard Error of the Mean.  
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Table 6: tests of significance of changes in the mean R2 over the years, for survival regressions. SEM: Standard Error of the Mean.  
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APPENDIX: Supplementary material for the benefit of the referees. 
 
 
This appendix contains further robustness analysis for the benefit of the referees, providing results 
on statistical significance of changes in the R2 from alternative specifications.  
 
Table A1: Growth Rate regressions for each year. Columns (1) to (5) contain the baseline regressors, 
while columns (6) to (9) include lagged growth as a further control variable. 
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Table A2: Growth Rate regressions for each year, for firms with above-median start-up size. Columns 
(1) to (5) contain the baseline regressors, while columns (6) to (9) control for lagged growth. 
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Table A3: Survival regressions for each year. Columns (1) to (5) contain the baseline regressors, while 
columns (6) to (9) include lagged growth as a further control variable. 
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Table A4: Survival regressions for each year, for firms with above-median start-up size. Columns (1) 
to (5) contain the baseline regressors, while columns (6) to (9) control for lagged growth. 
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Figure A1: Evolution of bootstrapped Nagelkerke R2 distribution for growth regressions (full model). 
Bootstrapped sample size n=1000, replications r=1000. Box plots refer to baseline plus lagged growth 
(left) and above-median start-up size with lagged growth (right). 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure A2: Distribution of bootstrapped Nagelkerke R2 statistics obtained from probit survival 
regressions, n=1000, replications r=1000. Box plots refer to baseline plus lagged growth (left) and 
above-median start-up size with lagged growth (right). 
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Table A5: Bootstrapped distributions of R2 statistics: means and the standard errors of the means 
(SEMs), obtained from growth rate regressions 
 
 
 
Table A6: Bootstrapped distributions of R2 statistics: means and the standard errors of the means 
(SEMs), obtained from survival regressions 
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